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GIARRATANO v. PROCUNIER
891 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1989)
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
FACTS
At a bench trial in Norfolk, Virginia in 1979, Joseph M.
Giarratano was convicted of the rape and murder of Michelle Kline,
and the murder of Ms. Kline's mother. After the crimes, Giarratano
fled to Jacksonville Florida where he surrendered to a police officer
and confessed to the crimes. He confessed again upon his return to
Norfolk, but attempted to commit suicide while incarcerated at a
local jail. The Norfolk trial court sent Giarratano to the Central State
Hospital to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. The
examining physician concluded not only that Giarratano was
competent to stand trial, but that he was not mentally ill at the time of
the offense.
At trial, Giarratano pled not guilty by reason of insanity, but
was found guilty of the crimes. Nevertheless, at his request and for
the purpose of sentencing, Giarratano was examined at the Forensic
Clinic of the University of Virginia to determine whether, at the time
of the offense, he was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance or whether his capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of the
law was significantly impaired.
The trial court, after testimony by the director of the clinic, Dr.
Robert C. Showalter and State Psychiatrist Dr. Miller M. Ryans,
found evidence of future dangerousness and that Giarratano's
evidence of "stress and reduced control" did not call for a sentence of
life in prison. See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 and 264.4 (1983 Repl.
Vol.). The trial judge sentenced Giarratano to death. The Supreme
Court of Virginia affirne the judgment. Giarratano v. Common-
wealth, 220 Va. 1064,266 S.E.2d 94 (1980).
In his habeas corpus petition to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, Giarratano asserted that he had
not been competent to participate in the sentencing proceedings
because he lacked the capacity to provide information to counsel that
was necessary to construct his defense. He later sought to amend his
incompetency claim to include the guilt phase of his trial as well. He
argued that the correct standard with which to evaluate his compe-
tency was that stated in Reese v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312,314, 86 S. Ct.
1505, 1506, 16 L. Ed. 2d 583, 584-5 (1966):
... whether the [defendant] has capacity to
appreciate his position and make a rational choice
with respect to continuing or abandoning further
litigation or on the other hand whether he is
suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect
which may substantially affect his capacity in the
premises.
The district court rejected the Reese standard and used the
competency test set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 789, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824, 825 (1960):
... whether [the defendant] has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reason-
able degree of rational understanding-and
whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.
The district court refused leave to amend and dismissed the petition.
Giarratano filed a timely notice of appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
Giarratano also moved under Rule 60(b) for relief from the
order denying him leave to amend his petition to extend his claim of
incompetency to the guilt stage of trial. In support of his motion,
Giarratano sought to introduce new inconsistencies in the forensic
evidence introduced against him at trial, evidence that undermined
the reliability of his confessions. The district court denied the motion,
stating that Giarratano's evidence in support of the motion was not
"new," that it merely "reweighed" the prosecution's evidence. It also
held that Giarratano did not demonstrate that his counsel used due
diligence to discover the evidence prior to trial. Giarratano appealed
this judgment to the Fourth Circuit. This appeal was joined with the
appeal from the dismissal of the habeas petition in the Fourth Circuit.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit first addressed Giarratano's claims that he
was not competent to stand trial. The court held that the district court
did not err in applying the Dusky standard and that "there is no
substantive difference between the two standards." Giarratano v.
Procunier, 891 F.2d 483,487 (4th Cir. 1989). "Giarratano's
recantation of his confessions several years after his trial and his
assertion that now he does not know whether he committed the
crimes do not provide an adequate factual basis for granting an
evidentiary hearing" to determine whether Giarratano was competent
to stand trial. Id.
As to Giarratano's Rule 60(b) motion, the Fourth Circuit held
that only an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court would
warrant overturning the district court's order, and found no such
abuse of discretion in Giarratano's case. Id.
The Fourth Circuit also discussed four other claims of note,
which are discussed in detail below.
I. Admission of Expert Psychiatric Testimony on Future
Dangerousness at the Penalty Trial
A. Fifth Amendment Claim
Giarratano claimed that it was error for the trial court to admit
the expert testimony of Dr. Ryans at the penalty phase of the trial. Dr.
Ryans testified at both stages of the trial based in part on a pretrial
sanity evaluation of Giarratano. Giarratano's court-appointed trial
counsel was not informed that Giarratano had been taken to Central
State or that a sanity evaluation would be made there. Giarratano's
statements to Dr. Ryans, who apparently did give Giarratano some
warning that they might be used against him should he claim insanity
at trial, were therefore made without benefit of counsel in the context
of a custodial interrogation. Giarratano's claim on appeal has its basis
in the line of cases beginning with Estelle v. Smith. Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 456, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981). The Fourth
Circuit rejected the claim, saying that Smith did not apply.
Smith took place in the context of a Texas death penalty trial.
The future danger aggravator is the same in Virginia and Texas. The
trial judge in Smith entered an exparte order to examine Smith for
competency to stand trial, not as a matter of state law, but as his own
personal practice. Id., 451 U.S. at 456-7, 101 S. Ct. at 1870. The
psychiatrist made a ninety-minute examination of Smith and
pronounced him competent. The psychiatrist did not advise Smith of
his right to remain silent. Id., 451 U.S. at 460, 101 S. Ct. at 1872. At
trial, Smith did not present an insanity defense. At the sentencing
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phase, the State called the psychiatrist as its only witness. Smith had
no prior warning that the psychiatrist would testify at sentencing. Id.,
451 U.S. at 459, 101 S. Ct. at 1871. The psychiatrist testified as to
Smith's extreme future dangerousness over defense objection. Smith
was sentenced to death. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
"A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation
nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be
compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used
against him at a capital sentencing proceeding." Id., 451 U.S. 468,
101 S. Ct. at 1876. This holding was grounded in the 5th Amendment
and Miranda v. Arizona. Id., 451 U.S. at 469, 101 S. Ct. at 1876
(citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Smith's death sentence was
reversed.
At Giarratano's preliminary hearing on February 16, 1979, the
trial court appointed counsel for Giarratano and on motion of the
Commonwealth ordered Dr. J.S. Santos to conduct a competency
examination. The Commonwealth's motion was pursuant to Va. Code
§ 19.2-169, repealed in 1982. Dr. Santos was unable to determine
whether Giarratano was competent to stand trial and recommended
emergency hospitalization due to defendant's "mental difficulties."
Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. at 1069, 266 S.E.2d at 97
(1980). Giarratano was admitted to Central State Hospital on
February 17, 1979. His defense counsel was not notified of the
admission nor of the fact that a further psychiatric examination would
be performed there. Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483,489
(1989). Defense counsel raised no objection at trial to the lack of
notice or to the psychiatric examination conducted out of his
presence. Id. Dr. Ryans told Giarratano that he had the "right to speak
or remain silent as he chose" but that his "statements could be used
against him if he pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity." Id. at 488.
It is not said in either the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion or that
of the Fourth Circuit at what point Giarratano decided to use an
insanity defense, but Giarratano did employ that defense at trial. See
Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d at 485; Giarratano v. Common-
wealth, 220 Va. at 1066, 266 S.E.2d at 95.
The Fourth Circuit held that Smith was not controlling. Smith
had not been advised of his right to remain silent at his competency
evaluation, whereas Giarratano had received such a warning from Dr.
Ryans. Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d at 488. Also, Smith did not
plead insanity and Giarratano did. Dr. Ryans' testimony was held to
be admissible at the guilt phase to rebut Giarratano's plea of insanity.
Id. Dr. Ryans' testimony was also held admissible at the sentencing
phase where Giarratano had made it clear that he would present
psychiatric evidence for the purpose of mitigation. Id.
ANALYSIS
The critical issue in the Fourth Circuit's discussion of
Giarratano's Fifth Amendment claim is whether precedent indicates
that a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights for all purposes comes about
when a capital defendant elects to put on expert evidence of insanity.
It seems clear from Smith and Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S.
402, 107 S. Ct. 2906, 97 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1987), that there is some
waiver of the right to remain silent when defendant offers evidence of
insanity at the guilt trial. This waiver clearly covers testimony of a
state psychiatrist on the issue of insanity at the guilt phase.
When a defendant asserts the insanity defense
and introduces suppo-ting psychiatric testimony,
his silence may deprive the State of the only
effective means it has of controverting his proof
on an issue that he interjected into the case.
Accordingly, several Courts of Appeals have held
that, ... a defendant can be required to submit to
a sanity examination conducted by the prosecu-
tion's psychiatrist. Smith, 451 U.S. at 465, 101 S.
Ct. at 1874.
The Supreme Court in Smith also noted that the Fifth Circuit had left
open "the possibility that a defendant who wishes to use psychiatric
evidence in his own behalf [on the issue of future dangerousness] can
be precluded from using it unless he is ... willing to be examined by
a psychiatrist nominated by the state" Id., at n.10 (emphasis added).
In Giarratano, the Fourth Circuit apparently went beyond the
dictates of existing precedent to hold that the waiver brought about
by his insanity evidence was a complete one, extending to the penalty
trial. In any event, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Giarratano's use
of psychiatric evidence at that proceeding could be conditioned on
the Commonwealth's rebuttal from Dr. Ryans: Giarratano's introduc-
tion of psychiatric evidence for the purpose of mitigation enabled the
prosecution to introduce psychiatric evidence, including that derived
from an examination of Giarratano, to show future dangerousness. In
Smith the Court observed that "a different situation arises where a
defendant intends to introduce psychiatric evidence at the penalty
phase." Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d at 488 (quoting Smith, 451
U.S. at 472, 101 S. Ct. at 1877).
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not answered this question
directly, there are indications that it might not reach the conclusion
reached by the Fourth Circuit. In Powell v. Texas, 109 S. Ct. 3146,
106 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1989), the Court observed. "Nothing in Smith, or
any other decision of this Court, suggests that a defendant opens the
door to the admission of psychiatric evidence on future dangerous-
ness by raising an insanity defense at the guilt stage of trial." Id. at
3150 n.3. It is therefore possible that the defendant cannot be put to
the choice of either forgoing expert mental mitigation testimony or
facing hostile testimony from a state psychiatrist based on compelled
statements. See also Bennett, Is Preclusion Under Va. Code Ann. §
192-264-3:1 Unconstitutional?, 2 Capital Defense Digest 24 (Nov.
1989); Fitch, Restrictions on the State's Use of Mental Health
Experts in Capital Trials, Id. at 21. Given these reservations, the
Fourth Circuit's holding should be limited to the unique facts of
Giarratano's case. However, Virginia attorneys should consider
themselves on notice that any decision to offer expert evidence of
insanity must be weighed against the possibility that the process will
develop evidence which the Commonwealth may seek to use against
a client at the penalty trial.
B. Sixth Amendment Claim
Giarratano was examined without prior notice to counsel that
the results would be used at the penalty phase on the issue of future
dangerousness. Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d at
488-9. This was also the case in Smith. Smith, 451 U.S. at 470-71,
101 S. Ct. at 1876-77. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that this was
a violation of the accused's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel. Id. Giarratano's counsel was appointed on February 16,
1979, and Giarratano was sent to Central State Hospital on February
17, 1979, for an evaluation without notice to counsel. It is almost
certain that the evaluation, upon which at least part of the testimony
of Dr. Ryans on the future danger issue was based, took place before
there was any decision made by defense counsel to plead insanity.
However, neither the state supreme court opinion, Giarratano v.
Commonwealth, supra, nor the Fourth Circuit's opinion, Giarratano
v. Procunier, supra, state when this decision was made.
The Fourth Circuit ruled that Giarratano was "not entitled to
relief on the basis of his Sixth Amendment claim that his right to
counsel was abridged. Giarratano's counsel did not object to the lack
of opportunity to consult with his client before the competency or
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sanity examination. Nor did he object at the penalty phase to the
testimony of the psychiatrist who conducted the examination. The
absence of objections raises a procedural bar to the assertion of
infringement of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, unless Giarratano
can show cause for the procedural default and resulting prejudice."
Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d at 489. Giarratano sought to
overcome the procedural bar by pleading ineffective assistance of
counsel, limited to the penalty phase. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that
the claim of ineffective representation did not justify avoidance of the
default. The Fourth Circuit wrote that "trial counsel correctly
anticipated Smith, which noted that the testimony of a prosecutor's
psychiatrist is admissible when the defendant presents psychiatric
testimony at the penalty phase .... Moreover... there was no
infringement of Giarratano's Fifth Amendment right to be free of
self-incrimination. Giarratano cannot show prejudice." Id. at 489-90.
ANALYSIS
In Powell v. Texas, the Supreme Court cited Smith as holding
that ".. once a capital defendant is formally charged, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel precludes such an examination without
first notifying counsel that 'the psychiatric examination [will]
encompass the issue of their client's future dangerousness."' Powell,
109 S. Ct. 3146, 3147, 106 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1989). The Court noted
that its judgment had been unanimous on this point. Last term's
decision in [Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 100
L. Ed. 2d 926 (1988)] reaffirmed this Sixth Amendment protection,
emphasizing that 'for a defendant charged with a capital crime, the
decision whether to submit to a psychiatric examination designed to
determine his future dangerousness is "literally a life or death matter"
which the defendant should not be required to face without the
"guiding hand of counsel." Id., 109 S. Ct. at 3147-8.
It seems clear that Powell prohibits, on Sixth Amendment
grounds, exactly the sort of competency examination to which
Giarratano was subjected without notice to counsel. The Fourth
Circuit in this case, however, makes it equally clear that attorneys
must object on the record to any failure to notify defense counsel of
psychiatric examinations, and to the use of any evidence'gained by
the Commonwealth after such a failure to notify.
The duties and rights of counsel after notification of the
Commonwealth's intention to conduct a psychiatric examination of
the accused are not spelled out in Powell. Assuming no intention to
claim insanity, counsel may wish to consider entering a formal
objection, on the record, to any examination ordered at the request of
the Commonwealth and either insisting on being present at any such
exam, or at the very least directing the client to stand on his right to
remain silent. That tactical decision must be made with the knowl-
edge that its effect on defendant's right to present evidence at the
penalty trial if he does not submit, and on the right of the Common-
wealth to use his statements to its experts against him if he does, is
equally unsettled.
I. Virginia's Capital Sentencing Structure Is Constitutional.
Giarratano challenged Virginia's "future dangerousness"
aggravating factor, arguing that (1) the definition of future danger-
ousness is vaguely written and (2) that the term is defined in two
separate sections of the Virginia Code and that the two statutes are
inconsistent. Compare Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 with Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.4 (1983 Repl. Vol.) (section 111(2), infra).
A. Vagueness In the Statutes
The Fourth Circuit held, without discussing the language of the
statute, that the future dangerousness predicate in Virginia's death
penalty statutes is constitutional. The Court cited previous opinions
which have approved the factor. Briley v. Bass, 750 F.2d 1238, 1245
(4th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 477-78, 248
S.E.2d 135, 148-49 (1978). The Fourth Circuit held that "the
constitutionality of the statute is buttressed by reading it in the
context of the already narrowly defined range of capital offenses."
891 F.2d at 490 (emphasis added) (citing Lowenfleld v. Phelps, 484
U.S. 231, 244-46. 108 S. Ct. 546, 554-555, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568, 581-583
(1988)). Lowenfield held that, while capital murder statutes must
"genuinely narrow the class of death eligible persons" to "guide the
jury's discretion," Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S. Ct.
2733, 2742, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983), the narrowing function may be
performed at either the guilt phase (through a narrow legislative
definition of murders that can be capital) or at the penalty phase
(through aggravating circumstances). Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244,
108 S. Ct. at 554, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 581 (1988).
ANALYSIS
To be constitutional, a capital sentencing scheme must
"genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty
and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant,
462 U.S. at 877, 103 S. Ct. at 2742, (1983); cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2950,49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976). In addition, "a
State must 'narrow the class of murderers subject to capital punish-
ment' by providing 'specific and detailed guidance' to the sentencer."
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,303-304, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1772-
1773, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 286 (1987).
Whether it is permissible to narrow the class of death eligible
defendants at the guilt/imocence phase and then justify imposition of
the death penalty by application of an unconstitutionally applied
aggravating factor is not settled. AlthoughLowenfield held that the
constitutionally required narrowing may be done at either phase of a
capital trial, factual differences between Louisiana's and Virginia's
capital statutes raise doubts about Lowenfield's application in
Virginia. Louisiana's aggravating factor (risk of death to more than
one person) duplicated an element of the capital offense. Virginia's
aggravating factors are distinctly different from the substantive
offenses they "aggravate." Also, unlike Virginia's aggravating
factors, Louisiana's factor has never been challenged as constitution-
ally suspect. See, Falkner, The Constitutional Deficiencies of
Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravating Factor, 2 Capital Defense Digest
19 (Nov. 1989) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court has declared
"vileness" aggravating factor identical to Virginia's factor unconsti-
tutional as applied).
The Fourth Circuit, however, echoed Lowenfield and sug-
gested that a state legislature may broadly define capital offenses and
provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances
at the sentencing phase or, as Virginia has done, may narrow the
types of murder for which a defendant may become death-eligible at
the guilt phase of the trial. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244, 108 S. Ct. at
554, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 581 (1988).
Regardless of whether the United States Constitution requires
narrowing and guiding and justifying, Virginia may not apply its
aggravating factors arbitrarily or capriciously. "A person's liberty is
equally protected even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of
the state. The touchstone of Due Process is protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government." Wolffv. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 952
(1974). Since Virginia has chosen to narrow the class of death-
eligible defendants at both the guilt and penalty phases, the state has
a constitutional duty to apply the aggravating factors fairly and
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evenly. Id. Insofar as the Fourth Circuit implies that Virginia may
pay less attention to its application of its aggravating factors merely
because the United States Constitution may not require the dual
narrowing process chosen by the state, the court arguably erred.
Another question raised by the Fourth Circuit's holding is: if
the constitutionality of Virginia's aggravating factors is "buttressed"
by the narrowed capital statute at the guilt phase, is the scheme
buttressed more under a truly narrow subsection of the statute, like
murder of a police officer or murder during an abduction, and less
under a broad-sweeping subsection, like murder in the commission of
a robbery or the rape at issue in Giarratano? See Mosely &
Richardson, Robbery, Rape, and Abduction: Alone and As Predicate
Offense to Capital Murder, this issue. It is clear that some of the eight
capital murder subsections narrow more substantively than others.
See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1988 and Supp. 1989). This is
especially apparent when the construction of the subsections by the
Supreme Court of Virginia is considered.
B. Conflict Between § 19.2-264.2 and 264.4
The Fourth Circuit also held that, although Virginia's capital
punishment statutes conflict as to the scope of evidence permissible
to establish future dangerousness, application of the future danger-
ousness factor remained constitutionally sound. The Court stated:
The two dangerousness formulas define future danger
the same: a probability that the defendant 'would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute
a continuing serious threat to society.' The texts vary
only in the sort of evidence they allow to prove
dangerousness.... The variance is not significant.
One statute, § 19.2-264.4(C), simply allows a broader
range of evidence to be considered. Because the two
definitions are consistent and because neither is
vague, we affirm the district court's dismissal of
Giarratano's challenge to the sentencing scheme.
Code section 19.2-264.2 provides:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an
offense for which the death penalty may be imposed, a
sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court
or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal
record of convictions of the defendant, find that there is
a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society....
Code section 19.2-264A(C), by comparison provides:
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the
Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that there is a probability based upon evidence ofthe
prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense of which he
is accused that he would commit criminal acts of
violence that could constitute a continuing serious
threat to society....
ANALYSIS
There are two major differences in these statutes. The first is
indicated by the highlighted portions. The proof that must be
considered in the second is significantly broader than the proof
required in the second. Significantly, § 19.2-264.2 seems to indicate
that, if a defendant had no prior record, he would be ineligible for the
death penalty since there would be nothing on which to base an
evaluation of the defendant's future dangerousness. The second
difference involves the burden and standard of proof: under section -
264.2 seems to allow the court or jury independently to review the
defendant's prior criminal record and determine for itself what
weight to place upon the record. There is no explicit identification of
a standard of proof for this finding. Section 264A(C) requires the
Commonwealth to prove future danger beyond a reasonable doubt. It
is difficult to agree with the Fourth Circuit that the two statutes are
"consistent." They represent two ends of the spectrum. Section 19.2-
264.2 represents a narrow class of evidence which can be given
unspecified weight while section 19.2-264.4(C) delineates a large
body of evidence which can be used to meet a relatively high
standard of proof.
The Fourth Circuit correctly noted that the two statutes define
future danger in identical language. What is questionable, however, is
the apparent conclusion of the court that the constitutional inquiry
ends there. Whether a defendant "would constitute a continuing and
serious threat to society" is highly dependant upon what proof is
admissible to show future danger, who has the burden of proving it,
and how much evidence is necessary before future danger can be said
to exist. As to those points, the statutes are inconsistent. It is at least
surprising that the inconsistency is treated as constitutionally
irrelevant.
I. The Sentencing Court Did Not Err In Considering
Evidence of Giarratano's Mental Illness and Drug
Abuse As Aggravating Factors.
In the Fourth Circuit, Giarratano asserted, as he did at the
sentencing hearing, that he suffered from mental illness and from
substance abuse. He argued that the trial judge impermissibly
considered those facts as aggravating. The Fourth Circuitheld that:
Giarratano's future dangerousness was based on his
voluntary substance abuse in addition to his prior con-
victions and other past bad acts and the circumstances
surrounding the deaths of the two victims. These are
fully set forth in the sentencing memorandum of the
trial judge and summarized in the Virginia Supreme
Court's decision affirming his conviction (citations
omitted). All are permissible factors in the decision to
impose the death sentence. (emphasis added).
Code section 19.2-264.4 provides that evidence admissible to
mitigate against a sentence of death includes "the circumstances
surrounding the offense, the history and background of the defendant,
and any other facts in mitigation of the offense." Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-264.4 (1983 Repl. Vol.). That section also provides a non-
exclusive list of evidence which may be considered in mitigation
which includes facts that indicate that".. . (ii) the capital felony was
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance or ... (iv) at the time of the commis-
sion of the capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was significantly impaired .... Id.
The trial court sentenced Giarratano to death exclusively on
the basis of his future dangerousness. See Giarratano v. Common-
wealth, 220 Va. at 1077-78, 266 S.E.2d at 102 (trial judge's memo-
randum). The trial judge, after hearing evidence of Giarratano's
mental state at the time of the offense, concluded that:
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... the evidence of emotional stress and reduced
control, while admissible by statute and carefully
considered by the court, is not of such nature as to
mitigate the penalty in this case. By becoming a
habituate of drugs and alcohol one does not cloak
himseIf with immunity from penalty for his criminal
acts. Id. (emphasis added).
ANALYSIS
(1) Comparison to Penry v. Lynaugh.
Capital sentencers (either juries or judges) must be advised
that they may consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence
relevant to a defendant's background, character, or the circumstances
surrounding the offense. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106
L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989); see also, CapitalDefense Digest, Vol. 2, No.1
at 2 (Nov. 1989) (briefing and discussing Penry). In Penry, the
Supreme Court invalidated a Texas sentencing scheme which,
although it allowed the jury to consider Penry's evidence of mental
retardation as mitigating, did not allow the jury to give the evidence
mitigating effect. This was so because, without an instruction
informing the jury that it could give mitigating effect to evidence of
retardation, such evidence would naturally indicate a greater
likelihood of future danger, Texas' only aggravating factor. The
Court held that evidence of mental retardation was clearly mitigating.
The Penry Court reaffirmed that "a sentencer may not be precluded
from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any relevant
mitigating evidence offered by the defendant as the basis for a
sentence less than death." Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2946 (citing Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,98 S. Ct. 2954,57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978) and
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1982)). "Relevant mitigating evidence" includes any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense. Lockett, 98 S. Ct. at 2964.
Evidence admitted at trial showed that Giarratano was under
"extreme emotional distress" and that his capacity to conform his
conduct was "substantially impaired" as a result of his tumultuous
childhood and his history of substance abuse - statutory mitigating
factors. Both psychiatrists, however, testified that Giarratano's
mental condition, exacerbated by his substance abuse, made him
more likely to present a continuing danger to society - treating the
evidence as aggravating. Viewing the language in the trial judge's
memorandum, it appears that the sentencer gave no independent
mitigating effect to Giarratano's mental state. Thus, Penry's "may
not refuse to consider" language is implicated. Penry, while not
controlling, is relevant. Giarratano's mental condition in combination
- alcoholism, drug abuse, mental illness and intoxication on the day
of the offense - was no more voluntary than Penry's mental
retardation. Cf. section IV(2), infra (discussing substance abuse alone
as a mitigating factor). Additionally, Giarratano's mental condition,
like Penry's mental retardation, would naturally be considered to add
to the likelihood of a defendant's future dangerousness and in fact
was found by both psychiatrists to do so.
The difference between Penry and Giarratano is that in Penry,
the jury could consider Penry's mental retardation evidence as
mitigating, but could not give it mitigating effect. In Giarratano, the
trial judge may have refused to consider Giarratano's mental
mitigation evidence as mitigating. The judge, in his memorandum,
stated that the evidence was "not of such a nature as to mitigate the
penalty in this case." He did not report that he found the evidence
lacking in sufficient weight after considering it as mitigating.
Moreover, the choice at the sentencing hearing is between a
life sentence and death. Even if the trial judge had considered
Giarraiano's evidence of substance abuse "of such a nature".to
mitigate against a death sentence, Giarratano would still be subject to
the second highest punishment available in Virginia. He would not,
as the trial court suggested, "cloak himself with immunity from
penalty for his criminal acts." Id.
(2) Addictive Substance Abuse as a Mitigating Factor.
The evidence indicated that Giarratano's history of substance
abuse and his tumultuous family background were inextricably
connected and, together, contributed to the impairment of his ability
to conform his conduct to the law-an expressly designated
mitigating-factor. If, in fact, the trial judge failed to consider the
whole package as mitigating, it might well have been because of the
"voluntary" nature of the substance abuse. That would explain the
correct but irrelevant assertion that by such abuse, Giarratano did not
"cloak himself with immunity from penalty." Virginia courts have
long and consistently held that voluntary intoxication is legally
insignificant in every respect except as it might relate to the existence
of premeditation. See Director of Dept. of Corrections v. Jones, 229
Va. 333, 329 S.E.2d 33 (1985) (voluntary intoxication is no defense
for crimes of robbery and use of firearm in commission of felony);
Chittum v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 12, 174 S.E.2d 779 (1970) (no
defense to kidnapping and attempted rape); Jordan v. Common-
wealth, 181 Va. 490, 25 S.E.2d 249 (1943) (no defense to criminal
conduct in general). But see, Griggs v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 46,
255 S.E.2d 475 (1979) (voluntary intoxication may negate delibera-
tion and premeditation). Cf., Arey v. Peyton, 209 Va. 370, 164 S.E.2d
691 (1968) (voluntary intoxication which produces permanent
insanity will not eliminate insanity defense).
Two things should be remembered, however. First, Giarra-
tano's evidence was being considered at the penalty trial, not the
guiltrmocence phase. Second, Virginia law is not settled on the
question of whether habitual, addictive substance abuse is "volun-
tary" or "involuntary." See, e.g. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 135 Va.
524, 115 S.E. 673 (1923) (involuntary intoxication can be affirmative
defense to criminal acts). Indeed, the modem trend in capital
sentencing trials is to consider any amount of intoxication, even if it
is not the result of addictive substance abuse, as mitigating against a
sentence of death. See, ALI Model Penal Code §210.6(4)(g).
It is suggested that capital defense counsel should characterize
any habitual, addictive substance abuse as "involuntary," demonstrat-
ing in the words of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Johnson that
there was an "absence of an exercise of independent judgment on the
part of the accused in taking the intoxicant." Johnson, 135 VA. at
536, 115 S.E. at 677.
It is suggested further that, even if the trial court does not
accept the "voluntaryfmvoluntary" characterization at the guilt/
innocence phase, it is the only appropriate portrayal when consider-
ing substance abuse at the penalty trial. This is especially true when
the abuse is linked to a factor that must by law be considered
mitigating, whatever weight is ultimately assigned to it. If counsel
makes this assertion citing the requirements of Penry, Lockett, and
Eddings, a court or jury may consider the evidence as it properly
should-as mitigating. Even if the court or jury does not do so,
counsel should insure that the record reflects the attempt.
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